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Mobilising Social Rights in EU Economic Governance:  
A Pragmatic Challenge to Neoliberal Europe 
 
Owen Parker and Robert Pyei 
University of Sheffield 
 
Abstract 
$ ¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DV\PPHWU\· exists at the heart of contemporary EU socio-economic 
governance, privileging the economic at the expense of the social. Prevailing academic responses 
suggest, on the one hand, the need for radical constitutional reforms aimed at redressing this 
asymmetry and, on the other hand, piecemeal reforms reliant on current soft and non-binding  
modes of governance for the championing of social concerns. Offering a pragmatic middle way 
between these positions, we identify the potential within the extant constitutional settlement to 
pursue a rebalancing in favour of the social. In particular, we highlight WKH&RPPLVVLRQ·VSUH-
existing legal and rhetorical commitment to social rights, arguing that it might draw on the 
VWDQGDUGVHVWDEOLVKHGE\WKH&RXQFLORI(XURSH·V(XURSHDQ Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) 
and incorporate these into its economic governance mechanism, the European Semester. Such a 
step would usefully repoliticise socio-economic governance in the short-term and promote 
radical reform in the long term.  
Key Words: Eurozone crisis; economic governance; social Europe; social rights.  
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Introduction 
The current status quo is one that, according to many critics of supranational economic 
governance, privileges further integration at the expense of democratic and social politics at 
supranational and national levels. It can be understood in terms of the pursuit of what Gill refers 
WRDVD¶QHZFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVW·LQLWLDWLYHRQWKHSDUWRIpOLWHDFWRUV 
[Such] initiatives are designed to lessen short-run political pressures on the formulation 
RI HFRQRPLF SROLF\ E\ LPSOLFLWO\ UHGHILQLQJ WKH ERXQGDULHV RI WKH ¶HFRQRPLF· DQG WKH
¶SROLWLFDO·6XFKERXQGDULHVSROLFH WKH OLPLWVRI WKHSRVVLEOH LQ WKHPDNLQJRIHFRQRPLF
policy. Legal or administrative enforcement is required, of course, since the power of 
normalizing discourse or ideology is not enough to ensure compliance with the 
orthodoxy (Gill, 1998). 
If Maastricht and the establishment of monetary union and its governance represented an 
LPSRUWDQW ¶QHZ FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVW LQLWLDWLYH· WKHQ WKH HDUO\ \HDUV RI PRQHWDU\ XQLRQ FRQILUPHG
*LOO·VDERYHFODLPWKDWDQHR-OLEHUDO¶QRUPDOL]LQJGLVFRXUVHRULGHRORJ\·ZRXOGQRWEHHQRXJKWR
HQVXUH¶FRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHRUWKRGR[\· as evidenced, inter alia, in the persistent breaching of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Parker, 2008). Indeed, for many of the élites pursuing this 
¶LQLWLDWLYH· the key problem with the structures of economic governance ² and a key factor in the 
spillover of the global financial crisis into a Eurozone crisis ² was precisely the lack of effective 
¶OHJDORUDGPLQLVWUDWLYHHQIRUFHPHQW·, particularly of levels of national public debt. This was the 
prevailing diagnosis of those political forces that led the reform process: in particular, a group of 
structurally SRZHUIXO ¶FUHGLWRU· PHPEHU VWDWHV OHG E\ *HUPDQ\ (Bulmer, 2014; Matthijs, 2016) 
and key European institutions such as European Central Bank (ECB) and European 
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Commission (Crespy and Menz, 2015) ² collectively, the ¶Brussels-Frankfurt consensus· (Jones, 
2013). 
 
Following from such a diagnosis, reforms to EU socio-economic governance introduced a range 
of new legal mechanisms and increased the executive powers of the EU (and especially the 
European Commission) WR¶SROLFH the limits of the possible·LQnational economic policies. More 
concretely, this has meant the imposition of socially deleterious austerity policies, particularly in 
highly indebted member states with low rates of growth. Against this backdrop it has been 
suggested that we witness LQ WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\ (8 YDULRXVO\ DQ ¶DXWKRULWDULDQ· 2EHUQGRUIHU
 RU ¶+D\HNLDQ· 6WUHHFN  FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP that undermines distinct varieties of 
welfare and capitalism and broadly accepted labour and social rights norms. In short, responses 
to the crisis have exacerbated DFRQVWLWXWLRQDO¶DV\PPHWU\·EHWZHHQWKHHFRQRPLFDQGWKHVRFLDO
in favour of the former (Scharpf, 2010). More generally, the conditions that have legitimised 
capitalism in the modern state, in particular the social and democratic contract between citizen 
and sovereign (Bellamy, 2012), have been undermined by neoliberal governance mechanisms.ii  
 
The current threat to what remains of the so-called European social model and a European 
democraWLF¶LQSXW· legitimacy ² in the form of parliamentary politics and inclusive governance ² 
is stark from such a perspective. And there is scant evidence that the empowerment of executive 
actors to enforce austerity will produce the economic growth that might grant the EU ¶RXWSXW·
legitimacy. Indeed, many heterodox and political economists convincingly argue that policies of 
austerity and ¶LQWHUQDOGHYDOXDWLRQ· ² primarily in the form of wage cutting ² are self-defeating in 
terms of reviving the European economy (Stiglitz, 2014; Krugman, 2015, Blyth, 2015). Contrary 
Comparative European Politics 
4 
 
to the Frankfurt-Brussels consensus focused on public debt and administering austerity ² often 
FRXFKHGLQWHUPVRI¶FRPPRQVHQVH·DQDORJLHVZLWKWKHKRXVHKROG² these critics highlight that 
simultaneously implementing public-sector austerity across states that primarily trade with each 
other cannot work as an effective stimulus. Indeed, such an approach has rendered the social 
consequences of the crisis worse than they might have otherwise been.  
 
We should be under no illusion that ameliorating economic stagnation and a worsening EU 
legitimacy crisis will be straightforward because a complex array of factors exogenous and 
endogenous to the EU/Eurozone context are driving this ongoing economic and institutional 
crisis (on the broader context, see, for instance, Gamble, 2014, Streeck, 2014, Rosamond, 2016 
and on the EU/Eurozone context, see, for instance, Parker and Tsarouhas, 2017; Ryner and 
Cafruny, 2017; Matthijis and Blyth, 2015). However, such difficulties have not prevented 
attempts to envisage alternative European responses. Such responses have taken broadly two 
forms. On the one hand, radical reform proposals have championed moves towards either 
deeper integration or (at least partial) disintegration. Some have, for instance, promoted the 
uploading of a social democratic politics and (rebalanced) constitutional settlement to 
supranational level, which would include the (re)regulation of finance and the establishment of a 
so-FDOOHG ¶WUDQVIHU XQLRQ· approximating a social-democratic federal state (Habermas, 2001, 
2013). Others have argued that the end of economic and monetary integration (the euro) and the 
restoration of national monetary autonomy at least needs to be contemplated. This would 
address the growing imbalances between surplus and deficit countries that the single currency 
has locked-in and provide greater space for a national social democratic politics (Streeck, 2014; 
Flassbeck and Lapavitsas, 2015). Both extremes would represent radical overhauls of the 
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prevailing constitutional settlement in the EU and in that sense both represent long-term visions. 
However, when we consider the reality of integration and disintegration blockages ² in terms of a 
lack of both popular and governmental support for both such proposals ² we would argue that 
neither will be realisable in the short to medium term in the absence of a significant further crisis 
(Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2013: 3-4).   
 
On the other hand, a number of pragmatic proposals have suggested ways in which we might 
rebalance a neoliberal orientation with social concerns within the (8·V FXUUHQW contemporary 
socio-economic governance structures. Often such pragmatic perspectives identify current 
practices of soft governance or policy co-ordination in social and employment policy and suggest 
that they might be made more robust via piecemeal reform (Zeitlin, 2010; Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 
2014). While far more realisable than radical proposals, as discussed in what follows, we contend 
that many such proposals XQGHUVWDWH WKH ZD\V LQ ZKLFK FRQFHSWLRQV RI ¶WKH VRFLDO· KDYH EHHQ
rhetorically transformed ² subsumed within a neoliberal agenda ² in the contemporary EU and 
overstate what soft governance mechanisms might achieve in the broader context of a hardened 
neoliberal legal framework. In short, they fail to shift the aforementioned constitutional 
asymmetry in any meaningful way. 
 
Reflecting on both sets of reform proposal we concur with Fritz 6FKDUSI·V insight that:  
>:@H«do not have normatively and pragmatically convincing ideas of what could and 
should be done if the window of political opportunity for a basic overhaul of the system 
should open « >3@olitically feasible policies appear to be ineffective and illegitimate, 
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whereas radical policy changes seem to lack political feasibility. In other words, our 
conclusions seem to resemble the advice the tourist received when asking an Irish farmer 
IRUWKHZD\WR7LSSHUDU\´,I, ZHUH\RX,ZRXOGQ·WVWDUWIURPKHUHµ-15).  
Scharpf himself proposes a series of reforms designed to fill the gap that he identifies. Cutting 
through the detail of his proposals, these are geared towards a rebalancing of the constitutional 
asymmetry and an opening of more space for differentiated integration, whereby states can more 
easily opt-out of integration in certain areas. His suggestions DUHRULHQWHGWRZDUGVHQODUJLQJ¶WKH
action spaces of national and (XURSHDQSROLWLFDOSURFHVVHV· (Scharpf, 2014: 18); essentially, the 
repoliticisation of a depoliticised socio-economic governance that would permit a shift away 
from the failures of a neoliberal austerity highlighted above. We concur with the broad 
orientation of these and similar proposals. However, ZKHWKHU WKH\ UHDOO\ VWDUW ¶IURP KHUH· LV
debatable; indeed, with Scharpf, we believe that for such reforms to be realisable a rather large 
¶ZLQGRZRISROLWLFDORSSRUWXQLW\·ZRXOGQHHGWRopen.   
 
In this paper we present a proposal that is closer to the pragmatic and technocratic reforms 
highlighted above ² a proposal that ¶VWDUWVIURPKHUH·DQGmight be realisable in the context of a 
far narrower window of political opportunity ² EXWDWRQFHKDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWRDGGUHVVWKH(8·V
constitutional bias. Notwithstanding the reality of such a bias, we believe that unfulfilled 
potential remains within the extant European constitutional settlement to quite radically 
challenge a neo-liberal reality.  We concur with Dawson and de Witte who note that, ´[l]aw can 
be used ² and has been used in the past in the integration process ² precisely as a means of 
politicising societal choicesµ  (Dawson and de Witte, 2013: 843; see also, Parker, 2008). Concretely, 
we SRLQW WR WKH (8 DQG (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ·V constitutional commitment to fundamental 
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rights and, in particular, social rights, as a possible basis for fruitful reform to its socio-economic 
governance.  
 
Traditionally, social rights have been realised in modern European nation-states through 
legislation enacted as part of the democratic process or via collective bargaining and these rights 
have thereafter been enshrined in international covenant, including in the European context: for 
LQVWDQFHWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSH·V(XURSHDQ6RFLDO&KDUWHU(6&, and the EU·V Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), 2009. Recognising that the hardened economic governance 
framework discussed above is in many respects at odds with commitments to social rights, 
contained, inter alia, in the EUCFR, we offer a potential way forward highlighting a new and 
novel role that social rights may play in guiding technocratic decision-making within this new 
governance framework. The current post-national monitoring of social rights already performed 
by the (Council of Europe) European Committee of Social Rights· (ECSR) monitoring of the 
ESC ² and hitherto ignored by the EU ² provides such guidance and should be integrated into 
the operating procedures of EU socio-economic governance.  
 
Existing legal scholarship on rights has provided a comprehensive account of the ways in which 
fundamental rights have been used before constitutional and international courts to resist 
neoliberal reforms ex post (see Kilpatrick and De Witte, 2014). Offering a different though 
complementary perspective, we highlight the potential for rights to act as an ex ante constitutional 
check within EU governance processes, considering the ways in which the Commission could 
and, indeed, should, engage with rights. The European Commission, as the key actor in 
contemporary socio-economic governance DQG D SRWHQWLDOO\ SRZHUIXO ¶SROLF\ HQWUHSUHQHXU·
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(Crespy and Menz, 2015) could and should abandon its orthodox endorsement of austerity and 
build on pre-existing links with the Council of Europe in order to learn important lessons from 
this Committee. In particular, an assessment of the implications of economic policy for social 
ULJKWVVKRXOGDFFRUGLQJWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·VRZQFRPPLWPHQWVEHLQVHUWHGLQWRWKHVWUXFWXUHs 
through which EU and Eurozone governance currently takes place: namely, the European 
Semester.  
 
The argument is built upon a careful analysis of EU primary documents relating to EU socio-
economic governance, the application of fundamental rights in the EU and the case-law of the 
ECSR. Insights from several interviews with officials in the European Commission have also 
been incorporated where appropriate. In a first step, we describe how economic governance 
reforms have hardened neoliberalism in the EU in recent years, increasing discretionary powers 
for executive actors, particularly the European Commission, within a technocratic mode of 
governance: the so-called European Semester. Second, we argue that while the social dimension 
of the EU has been largely subsumed within a neoliberal agenda, the Commission could, and 
should, use its significant margin for discretion to take seriously its commitment to the social 
rights contained in the ECFR. In the third and final step, we describe the mechanisms via which 
such rights could be incorporated into the European Semester process and significance of ECSR 
expertise in this context. In conclusion we are clear on the limitations of our proposal, which will 
rely upon as well as reinforce broader shifts away from a neo-liberal governing rationality.  
 
Crisis and EU socio-economic governance 
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The permanent structure of EU socio-economic governance is embodied in the European 
Semester, which is the primary focus of this paper.iii Introduced in 2011, the Semester refers to a 
rather complex (some would say convoluted) cyclical governance process characterised by 
regular annual reporting at supranational and national levels that is underpinned by a range of 
targets. It is concerned first (and foremost) with ensuring member state compliance with the 
fiscal targets enshrined in the revamped Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (public deficits to be 
kept below 3 per cent and public debt below 60 per cent of GDP) and WKH¶ILVFDOcomSDFW·of the 
Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance (TSCG) (structural deficit to be kept below 1 
per cent GDP). Second, it is concerned with ensuring adherence to an array of targets measuring 
macroeconomic imbalances and economic competitiveness, including current account balance 
and unit labour costs, determined by WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ·V 'LUHFWRUDWH-General for 
Economic and Finance Affairs (DG ECFIN) (see European Commission, 2012). Third and 
finally, it also includes oversight of ostensibly social priorities related to poverty reduction and 
HPSOR\PHQWFRQWDLQHGLQWKH(8·V¶(XURSH·VWUDWHJ\.  
 
The European Commission is the main actor in the Semester process in terms of both policy 
recommendations and enforcement. It initiates the process with the publication of an Annual 
Growth Survey (AGS) on the whole of the EU economy along with recommendations on 
general policy direction and later issues Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) containing 
specific policy direction to each individual member state. Both the AGS and CSRs are backed by 
detailed thematic Country Reports drawn up by the Commission, which account for the socio-
economic situation in each member state and the implementation of reforms from previous 
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cycles of the European Semester. National governments discuss and endorse the AGS and CSRs 
in the Council, but rarely change any policy recommendations. Member states submit national 
reform programmes detailing how they will meet the macroeconomic and growth objectives set 
out in the AGS, which are taken into account in the CSRs, and a series of bilateral meetings 
between the Commission and member states are held. Governments of the Eurozone states have 
to go even further and submit their annual budgets for approval by the Commission, before they 
are even debated in their respective national parliaments (Articles 3-7, Council Regulation (EU) 
473/2013) and, under the rules of the DIRUHPHQWLRQHG ¶Iiscal compact· $UWLFOHV -7 & 11, 
TSGC), are expected to discuss and negotiate all major policy reforms that may have 
implications for public debt with the Commission and Council.   
 
When a Eurozone state is adjudged to have seriously breached the aforementioned fiscal or 
¶LPEDODQFH· PHDVXUHV WKH &RPPLVVLRQ KDV WZR ¶FRUUHFWLYH· HQIRUFHPHQW PHFKDQLVPV DW LWV
disposal. These are, respectively, the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) ² substantially 
HQKDQFHG IRU (XUR]RQH VWDWHV ZLWK WKH ¶Two-Pack· UHIRUP SDFNDJH LQ  ² and the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) ² introduced as part of the ¶Six-Pack· reform 
package in 2011. Under these procedures, Eurozone states submit corrective plans to the 
Commission and receive guidance on reforms in the form of the CSRs and In-Depth Reviews. 
Any non-compliant Eurozone state that fails to address is breaching of fiscal rules (EDP) or 
¶H[FHVVLYH macroeconomic imbalances· (MIP) can be sanctioned. Unlike traditional EU policy, 
which relies on judicial enforcement by the ECJ, these mechanisms are enforced by the 
Commission, with member states only able to block these moves by qualified majority in the 
Council (¶UHYHUVH TXDOLILHGPDMRULW\ YRWLQJ· The financial sanctions themselves are significant, 
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amounting to 0.2 per cent GDP under the EDP and 0.1 per cent of GDP under the MIP, as well 
as restrictions on access to EU structural funds.iv  
 
Cutting through these technicalities of the Semester process, we can say that, in accordance with 
*LOO·V abovementioned notion of a ¶QHZ FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVt· project, the current design reflects a 
hardening of the legal and administrative capacity of actors to enforce neoliberal preferences in 
the EU and the Eurozone in particular. Monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms have been 
reinforced (Bauer and Becker, 2014: 219-223; Oberndorfer, 2015) and states have been obliged 
to implement reforms that embed neoliberal preferences in national legislation. Moreover, this 
has both relied upon and permitted a significant expansion of executive discretionary power. We 
have witnessed a proclivity on the part of executive actors in the Council to usurp the role of the 
Commission in initiating legislation. At times they have enacted legislation with a dubious basis 
LQWKHH[WDQW¶(XURSHDQFRQVWLWXWLRQ·the treaty base). This latter approach was adopted for the 
tranche of legislation that was pushed through to establish the more long term policing 
mechanisms such as the MIP and EDP $V 2EHUQGRUIHU SXWV LW QRW PLQFLQJ KLV ZRUGV ¶the 
ordinary revision procedure >WKH (8·V VWDQGDUG OHJLVODWLYH SURFHGXUH@ is being circumvented 
and/or the appropriate instruments are being pressed LQWRWKH´EXURSHDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQµLOOHJDOO\· 
(2015: 189). 7KLV KDV OHG KLP WR FKDUDFWHULVH WKH HPHUJLQJ VWDWXV TXR QRW DV ¶QHZ· EXW
¶DXWKRULWDULDQ·FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP 
 
If the Council has established the legal framework underpinning this new governance approach 
then it is, as noted, the Commission that is, in the context of the Semester, granted executive 
power and significant discretion to interpret laws and data, to pass judgement and impose 
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sanctions. The Commission has arguably been complicit in its own empowerment as executive 
actor in recent reforms to socio-economic governance (Crespy and Menz, 2015). Within the 
Commission power has shifted towards DG ECFIN (and some other economic DGs). A greater 
array of social and labour policy areas have been subsumed within macroeconomic coordination 
(as discussed further in the following section), wherein they are decided by DG ECFIN and the 
Economic and Finance Council (Copeland and James, 2014; Oberndorfer, 2015). DG ECFIN 
has, moreover, repeatedly proposed increasing its own powers of oversight of member state 
¶FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV· (EPSC, 2015) ² conceived problematically in terms of ¶VWUXFWXUDOUHIRUP·DQG
labour market flexibility ² in ways that critics have rightly asserted would lead to the significant 
further erosion of social rights (Oberndorfer, 2015: 199). Certainly such executive power is 
problematic in terms of its little regard for a separation of competences or institutional balance 
either within the EU or at national level; the democratic and social deficits that have long 
plagued the EU (Bellamy, 2012) are compounded by governance mechanisms that directly 
undermine these sources of legitimacy.  
 
That said, such de-politicisation unsurprisingly prompted at least some re-politicisation. This 
came from below in the form of public protest and dissent (Bailey et al., 2016) and in the form 
of clear rifts between member states and between the EU and other international organisations 
and sources of economic knowledge such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
Commission was not immune from this; in practice it did not strictly or consistently enforce its 
own rules, using its discretion to interpret data and define terms in ways that eased the pressure 
on, for instance, France, Italy and Spain (Mabbett and Schelkle 2014; Schmidt, 2016: 1044-5). 
Despite dissenting voices (Spiegel 2014), ultimately even a fiscally hawkish Germany acquiesced 
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to some extent in this greater flexibility. Moreover, under President Jean-Claude Juncker the 
&RPPLVVLRQ·V UKHWRULF shifted: its reflection piece RQ ¶7KH )XWXUH RI (XURSH DW ·
(Commission, 2017a) emphasised the importance of the ¶social dimension· (Commission, 2017b) 
and it was concurrently working towards ¶(VWDEOLVKLQJ D (XURSHDQ 3LOODU RI 6RFLDO 5LJKWV· 
(Commission, 2017c).v As discussed in the following section, such re-politicisation certainly had 
not marked a radical departure from a broader neoliberal agenda at the time of writing (mid-
2017). However, this (political) flexibility within the Commission (Schmidt, 2016) does at least 
speak to the possibility of more substantive change.  
 
The unfulfilled promise of social rights   
 
Economic integration has, since at least the 1980s, indirectly eroded social settlements and rights 
at the domestic level through its encroachment on domestic economic policy making autonomy 
and, with EMU, budgetary policies (Höpner and Schäfer, 2012; Scharpf, 2010; Streeck, 2014). To 
the extent that the EU has developed a GLVFRXUVHRQWKH ¶VRFLDO· WKLVKDVUHFDVW LW LQDPDQQHU
that is compatible with the contemporary competitiveness agenda established in the context of 
the 2000 Lisbon Strategy. This amounts to a supply-side orientation, which promotes various 
kinds of invHVWPHQW LQ ¶KXPDQ FDSLWDO· DQG UHMHFWV VWDWXWRU\ ODERXU PDUNHW UHJXODWLRQ DV DQ
impediment to efficiency, instead championing flexible labour markets (Schellinger, 2015: 5). 
Post-crisis reforms of the sort described in the preceding section have, on the one hand, led to 
more significant indirect encroachment by the EU through the introduction of tougher 
macroeconomic rules (especially on public debt) and, on the other hand, led to an expansion of 
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WKH (8·V DELOLW\ WR GLUHFWO\ LPSRVH LWV SDUWLFXODU YLVLRQ RI WKH ¶VRFLDO· LQ GRPHVWLF UHIRUP
processes.  
 
It is against this backdrop that we ought to understand the incorporation of a number of 
ostensibly social policies into the Semester process outlined in the preceding section. Thus, while 
there has been an increase in social goals in country specific recommendations (CSRs), 
particularly since 2013 (Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2014: 33-33) we should be circumspect about 
UHJDUGLQJWKLVDVWKH¶VRFLDOLVDWLRQ·RIWKHVHPHVWHU&ODXZDHUW,QGHHGLWLVLPSRUWDQt 
to consider both the content of those recommendations and the enforcement mechanisms that 
apply to them. On the one hand, where hard mechanisms are applied (for instance in line with 
the MIP), the content tends to align with the supply-side agenda described above. In particular, 
recommendations are geared towards greater labour market flexibility ² focusing on, for 
instance, employment protection and collective bargaining frameworks ² and substantive state 
spending ² focusing on, for instance, pensions and healthcare (European Commission, 2013: 17-
19; Pavolini et al, 2015: 65-68; Bekker, 2015: 12-13; Clauwaert, 2016: 12). According to one 
official in the more socially orientated DG Employment, every proposal they make in the 
European Semester must be conducive to macroeconomic competitiveness (interview, official in 
DG Employment, Brussels, 17th June 2015).  
 
On the other hand, where soft mechanisms apply to recommendations ² in accordance with, for 
instance, the Europe 2020 programme ² they have included at least some that are not clearly 
linked to a broader competitiveness or economic agenda (de la Porte and Heins, 2015). 
However, to the limited extent that recommendations support them, it is doubtful that 
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substantive social standards ² for instance, on pension provision and healthcare ² can easily be 
maintained while the more robustly enforced SGP targets (on debt and deficit reduction) are also 
met. Indeed, many scholars have highlighted the negative impact of fiscal targets on social 
spending (Hyman, 2015: 98; Pavolini et al. 2015; Grahl, 2015). A recent attempt by the 
&RPPLVVLRQ WR LQWHJUDWH VRFLDO VWDQGDUGV LQWR WKH (XURSHDQ 6HPHVWHU WKURXJK D ¶VRFLDO
VFRUHERDUG·ZDVPHWZLWKD VLPLODUFULWLTXHE\ WUDGHXQLRQV LQ VKRUW WKH VWDQGDUGV ODFNHG WKH
¶WHHWK· to challenge the direction of travel in macroeconomic policy (ETUC, 2014; Zeitlin and 
Vanhercke, 2014: 53; Commission, 2017d). Indeed, when we consider socio-economic 
governance as a whole it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, rhetoric notwithstanding, a 
¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DV\PPHWU\· 6FKDUSI  EHWZHHQ HQIRUFHDEOH HFRQRPLF DQG XQHQIRUFHDEOH
substantive social policies has become starker in the recent crisis context (Hyman, 2015: 98; de la 
Porte and Heins, 2015).  
 
7KDWVDLG WKH ¶(XURSHDQFRQVWLWXWLRQ·RUacquis is far from unambiguously neo-liberal. The so-
FDOOHG ¶KRUL]RQWDO VRFLDO FODXVH· LQWURGXFHG LQWR WKH/LVERQ7UHDW\ offers an example of this: it 
UHTXLUHVDOO(8DFWLRQVWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQW¶WKHSURPRWLRQRIDKLJKOHYHORIHPSOR\PHQWWKH
guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of 
HGXFDWLRQ WUDLQLQJ DQG SURWHFWLRQ RI KXPDQ KHDOWK· $UWLFOH  7)(8 As Vandenbrouke and 
9DQKHUFNHHPSKDVLVDGGHGKDYHQRWHG¶this [situation] requires the social dimension 
to be mainstreamed into all EU policies, notably into macroeconomic and budgetary surveillance, rather 
than EHLQJGHYHORSHG DV D VHSDUDWH ´sRFLDO SLOODUµ· Indeed, social partners have suggested that 
without such mainstreaming the &RPPLVVLRQ·VF¶(XURSHDQSLOODURIVRFLDOULJKWV· will do 
little to challenge the constitutional asymmetry (Lörcher and Schömann, 2016). The weakness of 
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the social pillar is reflected in the limited weight given to the social acquis. For instance, writing 
for the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), Lörcher and Schömann QRWHWKDW¶>U@HIHUHQFHV
to the common values and principles shared at the EU, national and international levels are 
presented as sources of inspiration, whereas they should be the foundations on which the Pillar 
UHVWV·HPSKDVLVLQRULJLQDO 
 
We concur with both the importance of mainstreaming social concerns and the importance of 
treating legal commitments in the social domain as foundations in an attempt to offset tKH(8·V
constitutional asymmetry. One such foundation exists in the form of the EU's Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), which was granted legal value in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty and 
refers to a range of social and economic rights. The Commission could ² we would argue, should 
² actively monitor these rights in the context of the European Semester. Indeed, the 
Commission's Strategy on the Charter (2010) outlines various mechanisms that were intended to 
ensure that rights were given due regard in all the political activities of the Commission: in other 
ZRUGVWRHQVXUHWKDWWKH\ZHUH¶PDLQVWUHDPHG·VHHDOVRMaduro, 2003: 285). It commits the EU 
WREHLQJ¶H[HPSODU\·LQWKHILHOGRIULJKWVDQGRXWOLQHVDUDQJHRIJRYHUQDQFHmechanisms geared 
towards this end, including: rights impact assessments, preparatory consultations with relevant 
stakeholders, processes for inter-institutional dialogue, and explanatory memorandums to detail 
how rights issues are affected (European Commission, 2010: 4-8). In short, these governance 
mechanisms are designed to ensure that fundamental rights are given due regard and that any 
interference with rights is legitimate and justified both ex ante and post hoc.   
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These rights mechanisms have, to date, not been deployed to any great extent, including in the 
context of the Semester (see Pye, 2017). At a technical level, there are two main reasons for this. 
)LUVW WKH &RPPLVVLRQ·V VWUDWHJ\ RQ WKH &KDUWHU LV SULPDULO\ EDVHG DURXQG WKH WUDGLWLRQDO
Community method vi  of policy-making, whereas, as noted, economic governance deploys a 
complex hybrid of co-ordination mechanisms and legal rules (Armstrong, 2013). Second, it is 
notable that social rights are poorly developed in the case-law of the ECJ. This is relevant 
because although the rights mechanisms highlighted above are not judicial, it is primarily the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ that shapes how the Commission engages with rights (interview, 
official in DG Justice, 2nd July 2015). The reason for this lies in the origins of rights in the EU. 
Prior to the drafting of the Charter in 2000, rights were introduced into the EU legal order on a 
case-by-case basis by the ECJ. As courts have generally been wary of adjudicating on social 
rights, preferring instead to leave such questions to elected bodies, the ECJ has, until very 
UHFHQWO\VKLHGDZD\IURPLQWURGXFLQJVRFLDOULJKWVLQWRWKH(8·VOHJDORUGHU(YHQLQUHFHQWFDVH-
law, social rights remain poorly developed, particularly when faced with the economic freedoms 
that have underpinned European integration in the single market (see Pye, 2017; Höpner and 
Schäfer 2012; De Vries, 2013).  
 
The Commission has expressed a wish to address these shortcomings on social rights. In its 
aforementioned FRPPXQLFDWLRQRQWKH¶VRFLDOSLOODU·LWLQWHUDOLDIRFXVHVRQ¶WKHenforcement of 
WKH ULFK DFTXLV DOUHDG\ H[LVWLQJ· F  *LYHQ LWV PDUJLQ IRU GLVFUHWLRQDU\ DFWLRQ LQ WKH
context of the Semester, the Commission could certainly use the ECFR to develop a more 
appropriate set of standards on social rights in the context of its socio-economic governance. 
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And it could do so by turning to another source of standards on these rights: a source that has 
been increasingly critical of the post-crisis erosion of such rights in Europe. 
 
Social rights in the European semester 
 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQ·VGHVLUHWREH¶H[HPSODU\·RQULJKWV(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQFRQVLVWV
as noted above, in giving weight to rights throughout its governance processes. Member states 
are required to do the same in the context of implementing EU law. The Commission has, as we 
have emphasised, been far from exemplary in this respect in the context of its recent socio-
economic governance and member states have failed to sufficiently draw attention to rights 
issues arising from Commission recommendations.  Injecting a concern with social rights into all 
steps in the European Semester process would offer a means of partially redressing the 
constitutional asymmetry between economic and social issues that has widened in the crisis 
context. Given its preeminent role in this process, it is particularly important that the 
Commission addresses its shortcomings in this area and takes these rights seriously. To think 
that social issues could immediately be prioritised is, of course, unrealistic, as it would necessarily 
mean a blanket prohibition on a range of current (economic) policies. However, in the absence 
of either deepening political union or the disintegration of EMU, the type of technocratic 
intervention offered by social rights holds the potential to address the immediate shortcomings 
of socio-economic governance, namely, as highlighted in the previous section, the re-orientation 
of certain social and labour policies towards economic objectives DQG WKH ¶VRIW· EDVLVRIPRUH
genuinely social recommendations. While technocratic in nature, such an intervention would also 
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force a confrontation with and bring much needed publicity to the human consequences of crisis 
responses. 
 
While relatively limited in the EU/ECJ, more robust social rights standards have evolved in the 
Council of Europe, notably in the context of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) 
monitoring of the European Social Charter (ESC). This body ² made up of independent and 
impartial experts on social rights ² has, in the context of its country reporting and collective 
complaints mechanism, established a considerable body of case law on how to interpret and 
implement social rights in Europe. The ECSR has also been active in the context of the 
Eurozone crisis, finding some government reforms in the context of the crisis to have breached 
a number of rights (Kilpatrick and De Witte, 2014; Jimena Quesada, 2014; see also below). Yet 
operating outside of the framework of the EU, the ECSR is currently restricted to a post hoc 
examination of national policies and so is unable to directly influence the formation of policy 
recommendations within the socio-economic governance structures of the EU. Working with 
the ECSR, the Commission could establish a set of standards for guiding a commitment to the 
protection of social rights. Links between the EU and the rights instruments of the Council of 
Europe have been productively developed in the past, notably in the context of developing the 
content of the Copenhagen political criteria in Enlargement policy.vii Moreover, the ESC itself is 
already linked to the EU in numerous ways: all EU member states are signatories to it; it is cited 
in the preamble to the Treaty on the European Union and in Article 151 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union; it is listed as a source for several of the rights contained in 
WKH(8·V&KDUWHURI)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWVDQGLWKDVHYHQEHHQGUDZQXSRQRQVHYHUDORFFDVLRQV
by the ECJ.  
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What, in concrete terms, might constitute ECSR standards? It is beyond the scope of this paper 
WRSURYLGHDQH[KDXVWLYHDFFRXQWRIWKH(&65·VFDVHODZ,QVWHDGH[FHUSWVRIWKDWFDVHODZDUH
presented in table one, below. It is important to note that these rights are addressed in two ways: 
as minimum standards and according to the principle of progressive realisation. Minimum 
standards constitute a baseline; if a state falls below minimum standards then the right is violated 
regardless of any justification. For some rights the minimum standard is straightforward: 
minimum wage and minimum welfare income have numerical standards of 50 per cent and 40 
per cent of national median income. For other rights the minimum standards are not so clear-cut 
and instead rely more on a case-by-case interpretation by the ECSR. Nonetheless, guidance as to 
what these standards are is still provided and outlined below. The principle of progressive 
realisation has allowed higher standards to be established towards which states should be 
working whilst still taking into account mitigating circumstances, including the Eurozone crisis 
(see ECSR, 2014b), that allow proportionate and justified restrictions on rights. Furthermore, 
progressive realisation includes non-retrogression, which means that any regression on standards 
already achieved must be proportionate and justified. The minimum standards and standards 
relating to progressive realisation for selected rights are outlined in table one.  
 
[Table 1 to be inserted here] 
 
How might these standards influence socio-economic governance? As highlighted in the 
previous section, several social and labour policy areas have been re-orientated towards 
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economic objectives. These standards can be used to draw these policies back towards their 
social purpose by embedding clear rights-based standards. For example, the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining and liberalisation of labour markets have been used as a (in our view 
misguided) means to achieve macroeconomic competitiveness. This has run counter to the 
standards established by the ECSR. In more extreme cases, such as in Spain, the pursuit of these 
objectives has actually breached the minimum standards. This has been the case for the forced 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, allowing unilateral employer derogation from collective 
agreements, inadequate notice periods for employment protection, lengthy probationary periods, 
and a low minimum wage (ECSR, 2014b). These reforms to collective bargaining and labour 
market regulations were requested through Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) (Council 
of the EU, 2011) and (as noted above) directly by the ECB. More generally, as the policy 
direction at the EU level has pursued flexibility in labour markets and reduced spending in social 
security, there is a real risk that minimum standards will be breached. To prevent this from 
happening, adequate checks on the policy recommendations, particularly those linked to 
enforcement mechanisms, could be incorporated into the European Semester and the socially 
destructive impact of these policies could be identified at the European level and prevented. 
 
Whilst the minimum standards outlined above would help to mitigate the more excessive policies 
being utilised in the Eurozone, the principle of progressive realisation has the potential to 
develop a stronger social dimension. It is clear that the drive towards flexible labour markets, 
decentralised collective bargaining, and austerity have interfered with numerous social rights, 
including many of those highlighted in table one. For example, decentralising collective 
EDUJDLQLQJLVQRWFRPSDWLEOHZLWKHQVXULQJFRQVXOWDWLRQDWWKH¶UHJLRQDOVHFWRUDO· level; increasing 
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flexibility in labour markets often undermines efforts to protect workers against unfair dismissal 
and ensure reasonable notice periods; and retrenchment in social security runs counter to the 
commitment to progressively raise the system of social security to a higher level and may even 
threaten the existence of a functioning social security system (see table one, above). Indeed, 
several studies by human rights actors have highlighted interferences with social rights in the 
responses to the Eurozone crisis (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013; Jimena Quesada, 
2014).  
 
As noted above, under the principle of progressive realisation such interference would require 
justification with respect to its proportionality and legitimacy. In the context of the Semester, 
justification of rights interference would have to accompany any CSR or recommendation under 
the enforcement procedures (EDP and MIP) that seek to interfere with or lower the standards of 
social rights, in a fashion similar to the aforementioned explanatory memorandums the 
Commission utilises alongside traditional legislative proposals. Here much would depend on the 
economic ideology adopted. From the neoliberal status quo position enunciated above ² and 
supported by the institutions ² the defence of rights infringements would likely rest on the 
argument that ¶LQWHUQDO GHYDOXDWLRQ· DQG consolidation promotes macroeconomic 
competitiveness, fiscal sustainability and therefore growth. However, such ideas are certainly 
contestable, if not disproven (among many others, Krugman, 2015; Stiglitz, 2014; Ryner and 
Cafruny, 2017; Wigger, 2015). A deliberative engagement with social rights would, of course, not 
in itself lead to the dominance of less neoliberal (for instance, neo-Keynesian) alternatives, but it 
would at least stimulate much needed debate within institutions that have long treated 
FRQVROLGDWLRQDV¶FRPPRQVHQVH· 
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Respect for social rights would also require and facilitate changes to the structures of 
governance. Two changes in particular would be required. First, a means to determine the impact 
of proposed policies on rights standards. As mentioned above, the rights standards in table one 
are only a representation of select rights. The full case-law of the ECSR is significantly larger. For 
these standards to be properly integrated into the Semester, it would need to be underpinned by 
some degree of background analysis of the potential impact of proposed policies that 
incorporate the standards established by the ECSR. Currently, the Commission, in conjunction 
with member states, engages in a significant amount of detailed socio-economic analyses of the 
situation in each member state. This is found in the Country Report that accompanies every 
PHPEHU VWDWH·V &65 and the In-Depth Reviews that are conducted for those member states 
experiencing severe imbalances. It should also be noted that the Commission already has ample 
experience conducting impact assessments on various issues, now including fundamental rights 
(see European Commission, 2010), within the ordinary legislative procedure. The incorporation 
of rights assessments with reference to the standards of the ECSR would not involve significant 
changes to the European Semester itself.  
 
The second change to the governance structures would be to incorporate a greater role for social 
partners. As highlighted above, one of the key minimum standards for the right to collective 
bargaining is the voluntary nature of bargaining structures. Decisions to decentralise collective 
bargaining taken at the European level without the involvement or consent of trade union 
representatives do not meet the standards established by the ECSR. The Commission has already 
proposed that consultations with European level social partners take place prior to the AGS 
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(Commission, 2014), though we suggest that national social partners should also be incorporated 
into the series of bilateral meetings held between the Commission and national governments 
throughout the European Semester. The active involvement of social partners would help to 
bolster the attention given to rights assessments, particularly given the rights-based strategies 
utilised by trade unions across the EU in opposition to austerity (Kilpatrick and De Witte, 2014).  
 
Conclusion 
 
7KHDUJXPHQWSXWIRUWKLQWKLVSDSHULVPRWLYDWHGE\)ULW]6FKDUSI·VDVVHUWLRQWKDW¶LW
may be wRUWK RXU WLPH WR VKLIW VRPH DWWHQWLRQ IURP WKH VWXG\ RI ZKDW LV JRLQJ ZURQJ« WR
controlled speculation about what might be put right if the window of political feasibility should 
HYHU RSHQ· $V QRWHG LQ LQWURGXFWLRQ D UDWKHU ODUJH ¶ZLQGRZ RI SROLWLFDO RSSRUWXQLW\· ZLOO EH
required to enable any radical divergence from the current trajectory given blockages to further 
integration and disintegration. The proposal we offer in this paper, however, would require a 
much narrower opening: it might be implemented ZLWKRXW OHJDO FKDQJH ¶E\ VWHDOWK· 6FKPLGW
2016); it is pragmatic, but (unlike similarly pragmatic interventions) not UHOLDQWRQ ¶VRIW-ODZ·or 
too deferential to the (neoliberal) status quo; it is purposefully built upon immanent but largely 
untapped EU constitutional realities (particularly the Charter); and its implementation would 
draw upon pre-existing expertise (in the ECSR). Moreover, it is realisable within current EU 
socio-economic governance arrangements and could be implemented by an actor ² the 
Commission ² WKDWKDVEHHQHPSRZHUHGDVSRWHQWLDO ¶SROLF\HQWUHSUHQHXU· &UHVS\DQG0HQ]
2015) and has expressed a rhetorical commitment to a social Europe (Commission, 2016, 2017c).  
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We are not naïve, however, about the implementation difficulties of our proposal, which would 
rely on shifts in the thinking of key (dominant economic) actors in the Commission. Moreover, 
although its strength lies in the fact that it might be enacted without member state convergence, 
in practice it may well require at least the tacit support of a coalition of key member-states for a 
more pro-social agenda. At the time of writing (mid 2017), the imminent withdrawal of social 
(XURSH·VPRVWLPSRUWDQWDQGORQJVWDQGLQJDGYHUVDU\² namely, the United Kingdom ² offered 
some hope for that agenda (Lindstrom, 2017). However, the position of the new French 
President, Emmanuel Macron, remained largely unknown, as was the outcome of the 2017 
German federal elections. Whatever that outcome, *HUPDQ\·VVWULFWDGKHUHQFHWRDQHROLEHUDORU
ordoliberal) orthodoxy ² underpinned by a desire to maintain its current account surpluses and 
competitive advantage (Ryner and Cafruny, 2017: 222-7) ² was likely to remain a crucial sticking 
point.  
 
Furthermore, even if implemented our proposal would constitute but a first step in addressing 
WKH(8·VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOasymmetry. Indeed, to focus on the Commission as the central executive 
actor in socio-economic governance (as we have done in this paper for pragmatic purposes) is 
not to endorse or seek to constitute this reality. Our proposal would lead not only to more social 
¶RXWSXWV· EXW DOVR pluralise decision-making within socio-economic governance beyond the 
Commission ² particularly through the aforementioned processes of public justification linked to 
¶SURJUHVVLYH UHDOLVDWLRQ· ² increasing both its deliberative RU ¶WKURXJKSXW· 6FKPLGW ) and 
¶LQSXW·OHJLWLPDF\ In the short term, taking social rights seriously would permit an opening of the 
Semester process to the Council of Europe and its substantive standards on social rights. 
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However, in the longer term such modest reform would, we would hope, lead to a more radical 
repoliticisation; paraphrasing Scharpf (2014: 18), an enlargement of the space of national and 
European politics. In short, the rebalancing or re-SROLWLFLVDWLRQ RI WKH &RPPLVVLRQ·V VRFLR-
economic governance might be regarded as a small but potentially important first step in plotting 
our way from where we are to a more radical social-democratic constitutional settlement for the 
EU.  
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Table one: minimum standards and progressive realisation of selected social rights 
Issue Minimum Standard Progressive Realisation 
Fair remuneration 
during termination 
of employment 
(Article 4-4 ESC) 
x Application to all categories of employee, 
including probationary periods 
x Termination notice periods based on length of 
service (or equivalent pay): over 1 week for 
under  ?ŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ ?ŽǀĞƌ ?ǁĞĞŬƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ
6 months, over 1 month for 1 year, etc. 
x Reasonable notice periods 
to ensure fair remuneration 
for termination of 
employment for all 
employees  
 
Protection against 
dismissal 
(Article 24 ESC) 
x Legal framework setting out valid reasons for 
dismissal & adequate compensation.  
x Specific protection regarding discrimination, 
Trade Union activity, maternity, family 
responsibility, worker representation, & 
retaliatory dismissal  
x Probationary periods no longer than 6 months 
or 26 weeks and regulated by law  
x Protection of all workers 
against termination without 
valid reason 
x Compensation high enough 
to dissuade employer from 
termination without valid 
reason  
 
Collective 
bargaining (Article 
6 ESC) 
x Level of bargaining determined voluntarily by 
social partners covering all matters of mutual 
interest 
x Protection against arbitrary dismissal for TU 
activity  
 
x Consultation at national and 
regional/sectoral level. 
x State to ensure joint 
consultation with equal say 
to employers and workers 
spanning array of issues  
Fair wages   
(Article 4-1 ESC) 
x No lower than 50% national median wage. 
Wages lower than 60% median wage 
permissible with demonstration they provide for 
adequate living standards  
x To make continuous effort 
for sufficient for decent 
standard of living including 
both material (e.g. food and 
housing) and social needs 
(e.g. education, social, and 
cultural) 
Employment  
(Article 1 ESC) 
x Requirement of concerted employment policy  
x Unemployment (particularly youth and long-
term) kept below extremely high levels 
x Prohibition of excessive conditionality (i.e. 
disqualification from welfare payments) in 
access to social security  
x Pursue policy of full 
employment through 
economic policy conductive 
to full employment and 
measures to assist 
unemployed to find work  
Social security  
(Article 12) 
x Cover significant percentage of population for 
traditional risks 
x Payments no lower than 50% of national median 
wage. Payments between 40% and 50% 
permissible if combined with other social 
assistance to reach 50% national median wage.  
x Welfare payments for reasonable durations 
x Reasonable period allowing for recipients to 
refuse employment without losing benefits 
x Restrictions to social security system allowed to 
x Ensure existence of 
functioning social security 
system established by law 
and funded collectively 
x Commitment to 
progressively raise system 
of social security to higher 
level 
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extent that effective protection for all members 
of society retained and does not reduce system 
to one of minimum assistance 
Source: own elaboration based on case-law digest and specific county conclusions of the ECSR (ECSR, 2008; 
ECSR, 2014a; ECSR, 2014b) 
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Italy calling for specific policy reforms were leaked to the media (Sacchi, 2015). 
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 One of the authors of this paper was involved in developing such links when working for DG Enlargement 
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substance and detail to the broader Copenhagen political criteria, particularly pertaining to human rights and 
minority rights. Similar use could be made of the expertise in the Council of Europe to develop more substantive 
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